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FROM CHOLERA OUTBREAKS TO PANDEMICS: THE ROLE OF
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
by Nejat Anbarci*, Monica Escaleras**, and Charles A. Register***
Abstract
Cholera and other diarrheal diseases are the second leading cause of death among the poor globally.
The tragedy of this statistic is that it need not be the case. Unlike many afflictions, the impact of
cholera can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, through the provision of clean water services. This
begs the question of why such provision is absent in much of the world. It is our contention that the
provision of clean water services is an increasing function of both a country's level of income and
income equality. We test these hypotheses by analyzing 1,032 annual observations arising from
55 relatively poor countries between the years 1980 and 2002. In the primary part of the analysis, we
find that providing clean water is, as predicted, an increasing function of income and equality.
Following this, and consistent with the existing epidemiological research on cholera, we find that both
the numbers of cases and deaths resulting from a given cholera outbreak are strongly and negatively
related to the provision of clean water.
Keywords: Cholera, diarrheal diseases, pandemics, per capita income, inequality.
JEL Classifications: D31, H41,110
I. Introduction
Cholera and humans have coexisted for centu-
ries, to the detriment of the latter, as the disease is
both extremely easy to contract and transmit. The
key to the disease's deadly success is a population
with limited access to clean water and improved
sanitation as well as a poor understanding of the
hygienic practices that can limit the disease's abil-
ity to spread. Thus, while occurring from time-
to-time in all nations, cholera is most commonly
found in relatively poor countries lacking high-
level water and sanitation systems and effective
public health programs. And the disease shows
little sign of retreat. In fact, as early as 1961, the
seventh known pandemic of cholera since the mid-
dle 18OO's had begun in South East Asia where it
is endemic (Nations and Monte, 1996, p. 1007).
Cholera is a bacterial disease which primarily
spreads through contact with tainted water. As
such, the poor, especially those who rely on local
rivers and streams or inadequately constructed and
protected wells for their drinking water and who
have only the most rudimentary sanitation arrange-
ments are most at risk. Of course, tainted water
tends not to remain in one location leading to the
spread of the early I960's outbreak of cholera in
Asia first to Europe and then to Africa, where it
became truly endemic. Spared initially was the
Western Hemisphere which had not witnessed a
significant cholera outbreak for a century. This
changed, in 1991, when cholera was detected in
two coastal Peruvian cities (Lima, 1994, pps. 1-5).
With nearly one-half million cases and some
3,300 deaths, the disease showed now mercy to
Peru. Brazil suffered next, where, by 1993, 70 per-
cent of that country's states reported confirmed
cases. Cholera thrives in areas with limited access
to clean water and the squalid living conditions that
typically accompany poverty. Thus, the hardest hit
parts of Brazil were in that country's extremely
impoverished Northeastern cities and states which
reported 87 percent of the total cases. In these
areas, the probability of death after contraction of
the illness was three times the national average
(Lima, 1994, p. 593). And, far from being brought
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under control, this current pandemic of cholera
shows little sign of slowing.
As is unanimously agreed upon by health care
professionals, however, the primary remedy for
cholera (and all diarrheal diseases for that matter)
is almost too simple to point out: the provision of
safe drinking water and improved sanitation and
hygiene practices. Yet in 1990, more than a billion
people worldwide depended on rivers, streams,
ponds or other unsafe surface sources for drinking
water (Mintz et al., 1995), where direct sewage
contamination is often present.
Of course, regardless of the quality of water
systems available to a population, human interven-
tion often lies at the root of the spread of cholera.
Even if clean water is available, cholera can rather
effectively spread if individuals practice poor per-
sonal and/or household hygiene habits suggesting
that in addition to high-level water systems, public
education programs as to the causes and mitigation
of cholera play an essential role in limiting its
spread. Equally important and also from a public
perspective, leaking, poorly constructed, inade-
quately maintained, poorly designed water supply
and treatment systems spread cholera quite effi-
ciently calling for the need for high-level construc-
tion codes and building zoning decisions.
Having noted the critical importance of an effec-
tive water and sanitation sector, why then does a
very significant portion of the world's population
still live with unsafe water systems? Much of the
answer relies on the relatively high cost of estab-
lishing and improving the public infrastructure
for high-quality water and sewer pipeline sys-
tems. This is especially the case in the relatively
poor countries discussed in general above. It is
estimated, for example, that a 50 percent reduction
by 2015 in the proportion of people lacking safe
drinking water and basic sanitation would cost
$7 billion per year, which is 30 percent more than
is currently been spent on all such projects (IRC,
2001, p. 6).
In addition to the importance of the absolute
costs and thus the level of national income
required for the creation of a high-quality water and
sanitation sector, it is our contention that the dis-
tribution of income within a country also strongly
influences the development of such systems. To
see this, recall that economic interactions between
individuals involve physical interaction and sup-
pose that two low income countries exist, the first
with a perfectly equal distribution of income, the
second with a highly skewed distribution in which
a significantly disproportionately large share of
national income is controlled by a few elites. As
discussed above, an effective water and sanitation
sector requires distribution/collection treatment
facilities, along with their underlying coding and
zoning requirements, and public health programs
designed to reinforce the importance of sanitary
hygiene standards. Each of these will require some
public funding which of course requires some form
of taxation. We contend that public agreement on
how the needed funding should be shared will be
much easier to reach in the former country with its
equal distribution of income—so long as the taxes
pass the test of "equals paying equally." In the
latter country, however, if public funding is to
take place, the relatively wealthy will be called on,
in any form of taxes other than regressive levies, to
pay the lion's share of the costs. Should this share
grow too large (that is, as the share of the pop-
ulation from the wealthy group shrinks), the
wealthy would likely withdraw from the compact
and attempt to self-insure by building small-scale
(household or segregated community) water supply
and treatment operations for their own use and by
limiting their interactions with the poor. Thus,
while we predict that higher average levels of
national income should be found to positively affect
the water and sanitation sector, the same should
hold when that given level of income is relatively
evenly distributed.
Before turning to a summary of our results, it
is important to note that the self-insurance the
wealthy of an income-unequal country might
pursue would, under all reasonable assumptions,
likely fail. This is the insidious part of many
infectious diseases, especially cholera: It is
extremely easy to contract even if one does not
directly come into contact with tainted water. For
the self-insurance approach to succeed (assuming a
high-quality water supply and treatment system
has been installed for a family or group of fam-
ilies) there must effectively be complete social
isolation between those with access to clean water
and those without access. This means that the
families of the rich and poor must not interact;
most domestic workers would have to be termi-
nated, along with drivers, lawn workers, and the
well-off would all have to limit social interactions
(restaurants, theaters, festivals and the like) where
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they might indirectly contact those without clean
water access any time an outbreak of cholera or
even hint thereof arises.'
We test these predictions by analyzing 1,032
annual observations arising from 55 countries and
3 continents that reported at least one cholera out-
break during the period 1980-2002. Given that
cholera is effectively mitigated by access to clean
water, we limit our sample to relatively poor
countries, those with per capita GDP's of less than
$4,000, where rates of provision of clean water
access tend to be relatively low. In this way, we
avoid the potentially misleading effects brought
about by what might be thought of as 'stray' cases
or even minor outbreaks of cholera occurring in a
relatively wealthy country that is not truly part
of the current pandemic. The empirical results con-
firm our predictions that per capita income and
income equality are key variables in determining
both a country's level of access to clean water and
in the extent and severity of outbreaks of cholera,
when they occur.
II. Data and Univariate Empirical Models
As discussed in the introduction, while minor
outbreaks of cholera can and do occur across most
of the world, since the illness is primarily a result
of poor provision of clean water services, regret-
tably cholera tends to target relatively poor popu-
lations. To see how the two variables of primary
interest per capita income and equality infiuence
the provision of clean water and thus cholera, we
analyze 1,032 observations on countries that
reported an outbreak of cholera for at least one
year between 1980 and 2002 and which had per
capita GDP's less than $4,000 during the year.
These restrictions give us 55 countries to analyze
empirically arising from the Americas, Africa, and
Asia (a number which falls to 39 countries when
we impose stricter income limits as described
below). Here, we briefly describe each of the vari-
ables used in our models. Table 1 presents descrip-
tive statistics while a list of the sample country-years
and the extent of cholera outbreaks is given in
Appendix 1.
We measure income as a country's GDP per
capita (GDPPC), based on purchasing power parity,
as reported in the World Bank's World Develop-
ment Indicators. GDPPC for the entire sample has
a mean of $ 1,641 per year with a rather broad range
of just over $107 to roughly $4,000.
Income inequality is captured by using a coun-
try's Gini code (EQUALITY) taken from the
database constructed by Dollar and Kraay (2002)
which offers the most comprehensive and con-
sistent sample of measures of inequality available
today. EQUALITY is a standard Gini code with the
exception that we have reversed its order to ease
interpretation and discussion of the models. Given
this, while EQUALITY maintains its standard
range of zero to 100, in percentage terms, ris-
ing values indicate increases in equality. For the
countries in our sample, the mean value is 55.61,
again with a rather broad range of roughly 34
to 77.
Our measure of the development of a country's
water and sanitation sector is the percentage of the
country's population that has reasonable access to
an adequate amount of improved, clean water
(WATER), taken from the Worid Bank's World
Development Indicators. It should be noted that
this variable is not available for each year in the
sample period, a shortcoming that we address by
linearly interpolating annual values from the years
for which data are available. That is, we assume
that the improvement that all countries in the sam-
ple experienced in terms of the provision of clean
water over the time period being considered was
linear. This is likely not the case, as water projects
are not completed in a linear fashion, however;
there is neither an alternative source for data on
clean water access nor any way to take into
account any non-linear changes that occur. Fortu-
nately, we are at least certain of the positive direc-
tion that annual changes are taking, limiting the
error that linear interpolation creates. This vari-
able's mean indicates that the average country in
the sample provides clean water to about 65 per-
cent of its population. More importantly, we do
see rather dramatic differences for this variable
between countries, as reflected in its range of about
27 to 100 percent.
Finally, for cholera, we use two measures; the
number of cases when there is an outbreak (INCI-
DENTS) and the number of deaths (DEATHS)
resulting from those cases, as reported to World
Health Organization. The typical country in our
sample reports a mean of roughly 2,433 cases of
cholera which, on average, led to about 73 deaths
when these countries experienced an outbreak
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TABLE 1.
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
INCIDENTS
DEATHS
WATER
GDPPC
EQUALITY*
DEMOCRACY
GOVERNMENT
URBPOP RATIO
POPULATION
POPULATION 14
LATITUDE
FLOODS
WARS
MORTALITY
LITERACY
Mean
2,432.89
73.18
65.37
1,640.79
55.61
2.62
13.58
34.58
6,540,000
42.47
14.09
3.16
1.18
86.52
57.51
St. Deviation
13,339.27
324.36
17.85
1,017.63
9.82
3.25
6.45
17.91
20,200,000
4.86
8.51
4.59
2.09
41.19
23.76
Minimum
0.00
0.00
26.94
107.49
33.80
0.00
3.75
4.34
300,000
57.45
1.00
0.00
0.00
15.90
7.94
Maximum
322,562
7,654
100
3,999.01
77.0
10.00
54.52
84.38
126,000,000
57.46
35.00
26.00
13.00
192.00
98.37
during the period. Both INCIDENTS and DEATHS
have rather wide ranges.
From the discussion above, we expect to find
the percentage of a population with access to
improved water to be positively correlated with
both GDPPC and EQUALITY. Since it has been
commonly shown in the epidemiology literature on
cholera, we anticipate that our measure of access
to clean water (WATER) will be strongly and
negatively correlated with both INCIDENTS and
DEATHS. In each case, we expect these relations
to hold even when controlling for relevant socio-
demographic and institutional variables. As a first
step in testing these predictions, we evaluate the
univariate relations between the key variables, pre-
sented in Table 2.
In Panel 2a., the sample is broken into Less-Poor
(GDFPC>$l,360) and Vety-Poor (GZ)/'PC<$ 1,360)
halves, based on the median of GDPPC. Generally,
we see the relations predicted above. Specifically,
Less-Poor countries offer their populations signifi-
cantly greater access to clean WATER and experi-
ence significantly fewer DEATHS when there is a
cholera outbreak than do Very-Poor countries. In
the case of INCIDENTS, no difference of statistical
or practical importance is found.
Panel 2b. breaks the sample based on the
median of EQUALITY. Here we find that the aver-
age, relatively Income-Equal country (those with
EQUALITY values greater than 56.55) offers its
population significantly greater access to clean
water and reports fewer INCIDENTS and DEATHS
when it experiences cholera than is true for the
relatively Income-Unequal countries.
Finally, in Panel 2c., the sample is divided into
halves based on the median of WATER, showing
its efficacy in the battle against cholera and its spread.
That is, when there is a cholera outbreak in a country
with High-Quality WATER (WATER greater than
67.6), significantly fewer individuals die from the
disease than is true for those in comparatively
Low-Quality WATER countries, though no signifi-
cant or practical difference exists for INCIDENTS.
These univariate results are clearly consistent
with the predictions discussed in the introduction.
There is evidence suggesting that 1) access to
improved, clean water is an increasing function of
a country's levels of income and income equality,
and 2) the provision of clean water is effective in
mitigating cholera, at least in terms of the number
of people who die from the illness. To put these
predictions to more rigorous scrutiny, we estimate
two basic regression models, as detailed below.
In the primary model, we correlate GDPPC and
EQUALITY with WATER with several included
controls that would reasonably seem to be related
to the development of high-level water systems.
These are DEMOCRACY, GOVERNMENT, WARS
and URBPOP RATIO. DEMOCRACY is included
as a rough measure of good governance. That
is, the existence of more thoroughgoing transpar-
ency in government should lead to more socially
24 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIST
^o
tú
&.
OHQ
Ü
(D
Q
(D
'G
E/l
(-!
D
ea
tl
, 
a
n
d
n
ts
•2
C
W
at
er
i'B.
P 
pe
r 
ca
QÜ
rt
131
OH
es
t
"Y
(U
O
2Í
s
.
 
D
ev
.
O
tn^
^^
A
î^
0.,
0,
Q
c
M
ea
A(J
G
D
P
.
 
D
ev
.
V
a..Q
U
ea
n
S
.^\/V
oa.
a.Q
V
ar
ia
bl
07
)
tN
Ci
*
*tN
tN
dtN
1
O
tn
u-i
.
46
m
q
•"*
?¡
•ri
m
W
at
er
o
o.
00
tN_
VO
tN
VO
VD
VO_^
t^
ON
tN"
.
42
!n
vo"
S
tN
en
tN"
a
In
ci
de
n
—^'
•X-
00
O^
(N
00
CN
1 —
[;
en
m
ON
tN
VO
D
ea
th
s
at
hs
dD
e
ca
co"
S
'o
;e
r. 
In
C3
Eq
ua
lit
y
tN
es
t
c
Q
d.
 
D
ev
.
00
m
vo
>o
A
O)
1
vo
A
E;^
QU
A
td
.
 
D
ev
.
1/3
.
55
vo
VAl¡
• ^
O)
B
Vl
ea
•n
m
vo
V
Ot
V
ar
ia
bl
40
)
en
*
vot-;
en
1
00
^^
ON
o
tN
VO
tn
vo
tn
en
vo
W
at
er
.
89
)
^«—^
•?(•
f
vo
d
in
S
vo
vo
VO_^
—r
ON
vqj.^
en
oo"
en
ON
en
en"
a
In
ci
de
n
45
)
ts
—^^
*
tN
ON
^^
r^
«ri
vo
^^
ON
O
ON
tN
._;
en
(N
oo
ON
D
ea
th
s
e
n
ts
cid
S
T3
ca
co"
.c
"ca
uT
u
cj
tN
1
es
t
•Y
*^
uCJ
Ji
s
D
ev
.
•g
c/3
o
voj ^
vo
A
o;
c
M
ea
.
60
vo
AOS
.
D
ev
.
•o
60
 
Si
67
.
V
t^
'^
ea
n
S
°.
\D\/
V
o;
V
ar
ia
bl
86
)
o.
tN
(^
'^
tN
" •
OO
en
en
o
tN"
VO
d
S
vo"
en
en
._«
vo
tN"
a
In
ci
de
n
m
)
1 ^
*
en
vo
, ¡
oo
1/1
r
vo
oo
votN'
en
O
O
ON
tN
en
D
ea
th
s
c _ _••
S,
optimal decisions being taken. As such, we include
the democracy index provided by Polity IV. This
scale ranks countries from zero to ten, with higher
values being indicative of more well developed gov-
ernmental institutions. In our sample, DEMOCRACY
has a mean of 2.62 and individual observations
cover the entire potential range.
GOVERNMENT and WARS are included as a
further proxy for a country's institutional arrange-
ments and internal stability. GOVERNMENT,
a country's general government, final consumption
expenditure, as a percent of GDP, is taken from the
World Bank's World Development Indicators. The
mean value for GOVERNMENT is 13.58 while it
ranges from 3.75 to 54.52. While we would prefer
to have a measure of a country's government invest-
ment spending, such data, to our knowledge, is
not available for a broad sample of countries over
time, and this lack is especially acute in the devel-
oping world. Thus, while not ideal, we use final
consumption expenditures to give us an idea of the
nature of a country's government. We include this
variable because governments tend to play very
different institutional roles in differing countries.
Those that are, on average, relatively benevolent,
may take a comparatively large share of national
resources and put it to work on various, useful social
infrastructure projects. In such countries, there is
likely to be a generally high level of acceptance of
this enlarged footprint of govemment as it is the
general public that benefrts. Of course, this is not
always the case as, globally, there are numerous
examples of government's malevolendy using public
resources wastefully or simply to further their own
goals. In other words, institutions develop differendy
in various countries and these institutions have an
impact on a country's investment of all types. If
the former interpretation is correct, on average, we
expect to find GOVERMENT being positively related
to WATER indicating that countries where govem-
ment tends to play a larger role, will likely have more
well-developed systems for providing clean water to
their populations while the opposite is expected if
the latter interpretation is more common.
To control for internal instability, we take from
the Banks Cross-National Time Series Data
Archive information relative to para-military activ-
ities such as guerilla actions, sabotage of infra-
structure, and the like. Our measure of instability,
WARS, refers to the number of such events during
the prior five years. The mean value for WARS is
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1.18 and ranges from zero to 13. Wars and political
instability can devastate infrastructure and health
resources, and lead to the displacement of large
parts of a country's population into often squalid,
overcrowded refugee camps where illnesses like
cholera can spread rapidly. Given this, the expecta-
tion for this variable is obvious: in such cases,
water infrastructure is likely to be a prime target
for insurgents thus a negative relation is expected
between WARS and WATER.
Finally, URBPOP RATIO is the share of the
total population that lives in an urban area, as
reported in the World Bank's World Development
Indicators. This variable, with a mean of 34.58 and
range of 4.34 to 84.38, is included for obvious,
practical reasons: even in relatively poor countries,
urbanization's clustering of people drives down
the marginal cost of providing clean water thus lead-
ing us to expect a positive relation between this
variable and the proportion of a country's popula-
tion with access to clean water.
Having established the relations between the key
variables, WATER, GDPPC, and EQUALITY, in the
primary equation, we turn our attention to the effec-
tiveness of access to clean water by estimating
regressions with, alternately, INCIDENTS and
DEATHS as the dependent variable. In each case,
we include as independent variables WATER,
GDPPC, EQUALITY, POPULATION, POPULA-
TION 14, MORTALITY, LITERACY, LATITUDE,
and FLOODS. WATER and GDPPC are primary
measures of development and, as such, omitting
GDPPC from the INCIDENTS and DEATHS equa-
tions would create the possibility of the WATER
variable capturing not just the pure effect of that
variable on INCIDENTS and DEATHS but also the
effects of other elements of the development process.
By including GDPPC, which is closely related to
various aspects of development, this variable should
point to the effect of those aspects of development,
other than WATER, that affect INCIDENTS and
DEATHS, We expect GDPPC to exert strong nega-
tive influences on both INCIDENTS and DEATHS.
EQUALITY is included as it seems plausible
that as equality increases within a country, there
might be more uniform access to factors such as
whatever given quantity of clean water is avail-
able, to medical facilities, and to public education
as to how to mitigate the effects of the disease and,
thus we expect this variable to be negatively cor-
related with the dependent variables. We include
two measures of a country's population, each taken
from the World Bank's World Development Indi-
cators, total population (POPULATION), and the
percentage of that total which is 14 years old or
younger (POPULATION 14), since the very young
tend to be especially susceptible to cholera. In our
sample, the typical country has a population of
about 6.5 million persons with a bit more than
42 percent being 14 or younger. In each case, we
expect the variable to be positively associated with
each of the dependent variables.
The next two variables are included as, admit-
tedly, crude proxies for the state of a country's
health care and education networks. Specifically,
MORTALITY is the probability that a newborn will
die prior to reaching age five, per 1,000 live births
for a given country while LITERACY is a country's
basic literacy rate, each taken from the World
Bank's World Development Indicators. The mean
value for these two variables, respectively, is 86.52
and 57.51. To the extent that more developed health
and education systems can serve to mitigate the
outbreak of cholera, its spread, and its severity, we
expect MORTALITY to show a positive relation
with the dependent variables with the opposite
being true for LITERACY.
Finally, we include controls for location and
climate, LATITUDE and FLOODS. LATITUDE
measures the absolute distance of a country from
the equator, taken from the CIA Facthook. Con-
trolling for LATITUDE, which has a mean of just
14.09 is important because, as discussed above,
cholera is by nature a tropical disease, thus, LATI-
TUDE should be found to be negatively related to
both INCIDENTS and DEATHS. FLOODS, with a
mean of 3.16 in the prior 5 years, is important as a
control since it has the potential to overwhelm basic
water systems, spreading tainted water throughout
a rather large geographic area (data on floods taken
from the EM-DAT archive available at www.cred.be).
The expectation here is positive on both INCIDENTS
and DEATH.
III. Multivariate Empirical Models
A. Correlates of Access to Clean Water
Our primary hypotheses are that the provision
of clean water is a positive function of a country's
income and its income equality. This contention is
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supported in the univariate models presented above
but, to more formally test it, we estimate the fol-
lowing two-way fixed-effects model:
ao + axGDPPCis,+(i-
+ (x^DEMOCRACY ,
+
4-
-f- aeURBPOP RATIO¡s,
+ ys + y, + "ist (1)
where each variable is as defined above, / indicates
a given country, and s a given continent at time t.
We use year fixed-effects, y,, to control for any
time-specific effects that shift the level of clean
water access for all continents which might include
technological changes affecting the creation and
extension of water systems, greater international
cooperation with respect to development of water
systems and the like, over the period under review.
Giving us the second dimension of fixed-effects,
the Y,- represent continents, allowing us to capture
any unobserved continent-specific heterogeneity
that is relatively fixed over time, such as general
weather conditions, topography, cultural norms
and so forth. Table 3 reports the outcomes when
both continental and year fixed-effects are con-
trolled, for all those country-year observations in
the primary sample—those with GDPPC's less
than $4,000—and also, to assess the stability of
the relations, for two subsets, those with GDPPC's
less than $3,000 and $2,000, respectively.
The first thing to note about the regressions
reported in Table 3 are the models' relatively good
fit. The results reveal reasonably high R-square
values and highly significant F-statistics indicating
the likelihood of the included independent vari-
ables being jointly equal to zero is virtually nil
and that the combined fixed-effects are necessary
to take into account continent and year heteroge-
neity in explaining differences in access to
improved water.
Of primary importance in Table 3 are the results
across the samples for the income and income
equality variables which, in each case, are con-
sistent with predictions. Regardless of the sam-
ple employed, as income (GDPPC) and income
equality (EQUALITY) increase within a country,
access to clean water increases and significantly
so, beyond the .01 level for each. It appears that
income and income equality, taken together, are
very powerful predictors of access to improved
water. Importantly, this result holds even when
the institutional variable for government transpar-
ency, DEMOCRACY, is included, which is itself
positive and significant (beyond the .01 level
across models). Apparently, in countries with rel-
atively high levels of political development char-
acterized by transparency and real public input
into government decision-making, the likelihood
of investments in water systems, increases.
The remaining control variables in the estima-
tion of Equation (1) are also well-behaved across
the three samples offering the expected relations
with WATER. Specifically, we find that as the foot-
print of govemment increases within an econ-
omy (GOVERNMENT) access to clean water also
increases, beyond the .01 level, in all but the case
of those country-year observations for which
GDPPC is less than $2,000 (though the relation is
positive here as well). We take this to mean that in
countries where institutions have evolved such that
there is a comparatively stronger, accepted role
played by government in general, there is an
increased likelihood of the provision of improved
water. Again as expected, across samples, we find
that the existence of domestic conflict (WARS) has
a consistently significant and negative impact on
the ability of a govemment to provide clean water
to its people. This is particularly reasonable in that
the variable specifically targets the types of domes-
tic conflict that can be expected to result in attacks
on public infrastructure. Finally, for each sample,
the percentage of a country's population that has
access to improved water is strongly correlated
with the percentage of that country's population
living in urban areas, URBPOP RATIO. While an
important control, this likely reflects little more
than the ease with which improved water can be
made available to a population when that popula-
tion is concentrated within a localized area rather
than being geographically dispersed.
Taken together, the results of the estimation of
Equation (1) clearly support our primary conten-
tions. That is, with a reasonably high level of con-
fidence, we conclude that the provision of clean
water is an increasing function of a country's income
and income equality. To complete our tests, we tum
to the question of how effective the provision of
clean water is in mitigating cholera. As noted
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TABLE 3.
Correlates of Access to Clean Water, by Income Level
Independent Variable
Intercept
GDPPC
EQUALITY
DEMOCRACY
GOVERNMENT
WARS
URBPOP RATIO
Estimation Procedure
R-Square
F-test"
F-test"
Number of Observations
(l)GD/'/ 'CLess
than $4,000
37.804** (3.1826)
0.005** (0.0005)
0.130** (0.0422)
0.405** (0.1365)
0.304** (0.0652)
-0.697** (0.1880)
0.278** (0.0310)
Two-Way Fixed Effects
0.37
94.20**
21.03**
1,032
(2) GDPPC Less
than $3,000
35.236** (3.4598)
0.007** (0.0008)
0.147** (0.0456)
0.564** (0.1571)
0.143** (0.0734)
-0.715** (0.2155)
0.360** (0.0373)
Two-Way Fixed Effects
0.32
69.62**
14.09**
904
(3) GDPPC Less
than $2,000
31.176** (3.8097)
0.004** (0.0013)
0.228** (0.0498)
0.928** (0.1811)
0.013 (0.0837)
-0.598** (0.2548)
0.455** (0.0446)
Two-Way Fixed Effects
0.28
63.97**
9.71**
712
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significance at 5% level, and ** denotes significance at 1% level. "Test of
the significance of the independent variables. ''Test of the fixed-effect model against the ordinary least square model.
above, there is a rather large epidemiological liter-
ature pointing to the efficacy of clean water in
dealing with cholera so the discussion of our mod-
els and results here will be brief (though a more
complete discussion is available upon request).
B. Correlates of Cholera Incidents and Deaths
To consider the effectiveness of the provision of
clean water in mitigating cholera, we estimate the
following two-way fixed-effects model:
CHOLERAis, ^ ßo+ßi WATERis,+ß
-f ß^LITERACYis, + ß
+ßs ELOODS ¡
+ßg EQUALITY is, + y i+y, + Sisr
(2)
where CHOLERAis, represents, alternately, the num-
ber of INCIDENTS or the number of DEATHS from
cholera for country / in continent s at time t and all
other variables follow similarly.
As with the estimation of Equation (1), estimation
of Equation (2) also takes advantage of the panel-
nature of the data by utilizing the two-way fixed-
effects estimator, y-, and yt. controlling for both
continent and year effects. In this case, the continent
fixed-effects might control for factors such as social
norms, climatic conditions, and public sector cor-
ruption that limits the effectiveness of any collective
action which differ between the continents but vary
little over time. Similarly the year fixed-effects might
capture items like general improvements in the treat-
ment of cholera that have come about over time or,
as discussed in the introduction, the unexpected
increase in waterbome illnesses that have af^ fected
all areas in the past 20 years.
INCIDENTS and DEATHS are, of course, each
non-negative counts of individual cases of cholera
and the deaths arising from those cases. Given the
over dispersion of the counts, we use the Negative
Binomial Regression model which generalizes the
Poisson model by expressly relaxing the assumption
of equal conditional mean and variance through the
introduction of a parameter that accounts for any
unobserved heterogeneity between observations.
Prior to discussing the results for the estima-
tion of Equation (2), we should explicitly address
the possibility, even likelihood, of colinearity in
this model since we include four variables
(WATER, MORTALITY, LITERACY, and GDPPC),
each of which is clearly an element of the process
of economic development. Should colinearity exist
between any or all of these variables, the undesir-
able outcome would be inflated standard errors
potentially resulting in insignificant coefficients
for some or all of these coefficients, when signifi-
cant relations actually exist. We view this as a
purely empirical matter. That is, should any or all
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of these coefficients prove to be insignificant a
suspicion of colinearity will be raised and will have
to be addressed. To the contrary, should each of these
coefficients prove significant, it may be concluded
that their natural correlation poses no substantial
problem for estimation or interpretation.
To conserve space, and given that the results
replicate much work done in the epidemiological
literature, we simply summarize our results for the
estimation of Equation (2), for the three income-
related samples—less than $4,000, $3,000, and
$2,000, respectively—which, due to their high-
degree of consistency, we discuss as one. In addi-
tion to very reasonable measures of goodness of fit,
in each model, there is strong evidence supporting
our secondary contention that both INCIDENTS of
and DEATHS from cholera are significantly reduced
when there is etihanced access to clean water within
a country. Regardless of the income-determined
sample, the coefficient on WATER is negative
and significant, beyond the .05 level in both
the INCIDENTS and DEATHS equations. Taken
together with the results from Table 3, we conclude
that, through the channel of improved water, income
and income equality play a major role in mitigat-
ing the potentially disastrous effects of cholera and
this result holds with controls for other measures
of development, population, and socio-economic
institutions, location, and climate.
IV. Conclusions
Cholera and other diarrheal diseases currently
account for 11.3 percent of all deaths among the
poor globally, making such illnesses the second
leading cause of deaths among this group. This
statistic is particularly troublesome given that the
origins and transmission mechanisms of cholera
are not just well-understood but nearly completely
preventable. Specifically, cholera is an acute intesti-
nal infection which is spread when a victim ingests
tainted water or food. As such, cholera can be sup-
pressed rather easily through the provision of clean
water and use of proper sanitation procedures. Of
course, knowing how to suppress cholera is not the
same as having the resources or public will to do so.
In tbis paper, we evaluate two predictions, that
a country's level of income and income inequality
are each positively related to access to clean water
and by extension negatively related to both the
number of cases of and deaths from cholera. To
test these predictions, we analyze a panel of
17 relatively poor countries who reported at least
one outbreak of cholera during the 23 year period,
1980-2002, given us a total of 1,032 observations.
Whether we look at the number of cases of cholera
or the number of deaths resulting from a given
outbreak, we find consistently strong results. That
is, there is strong support for the contention that
income and income equality, working through the
channel of the provision of clean water, are primary
factors in determining the extent to which the out-
break devastates a country and that this positive
effect of the provision of clean water is indepen-
dent of any other development-related factors that
likely also serve to mitigate the ravages of cholera,
such as better education about disease transmis-
sion, expanded medical access, and tbe like.
APPENDIX 1.
Sample Country-years and Extent of Cholera Outbreaks, 1980-2002
Periods of Outbreak
Total Number
of Incidents
Total Number
of Deaths
AFRICA
Algeria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central Africa
Chad
Cote d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Gabon
80, 83, 84
84,85,91,95,96,98-01
80-85, 92-95, 97-02
80-02
97,98
91, 94, 96-01
82,91-96,01,02
94, 97, 98, 00
82, 87, 94
877
7,980
14,173
23,587
4,538
37,340
18,945
5,538
156
27
585
406
1,962
633
2,541
874
100
5
(Continued)
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APPENDIX 1.
(Continued)
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
AMERICAS
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Mexico
Peru
Venezuela
ASIA
Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
India
Indonesia
Iran
Jordan
Lao People's Dem Rep
Lebanon
Malaysia
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam
Periods of Outbreak
85, 94-96
80-85, 90-02
86, 94-96, 98-01
86, 87, 94-98, 02
80-89, 92, 94-02
81, 83, 89-2002
84-87, 95, 96, 00-02
84-89, 96, 97
80-86, 89-94, 97-02
81, 84, 89, 91, 94-97, 99-02
80-89, 91-02
80-89, 91-02
81, 84-88, 95-97
86, 87, 94, 95, 98
80,85
90-02
82, 87, 91, 92, 94-02
80-83, 89-93, 97-02
85, 92, 93, 98-02
91-98
89-92
91-96
91-98
91-94
91-98
92-93
91-99
91-98
91-94
92-94
93, 99, 00
91-98
80, 88-97, 00
80-02
80-94
80-90
81
93-96
93
80-87
80,81,89-98
01,02
80-82, 84, 91-99
80-83,88,91-93,97-99,02
80-88
88-98
Total Number
of Incidents
25
79,573
40,947
47,981
72,825
122,127
17,575
12,008
226,761
14,139
134,249
8,155
27,860
31,604
4,474
117,486
69,851
60,889
19,650
42,548
18,637
24,897
93,816
27,365
71,726
642
15,244
31,878
630,539
754
4,473
13,618
75,738
127,040
83,455
16,270
870
17,246
344
4,035
57,950
12,096
11,212
3,502
16,863
20,621
Total Number
of Deaths
.
3,645
1,455
1,359
2,965
3,075
2,524
469
6,157
1,150
13,294
308
1,851
1,826
241
7,074
3,160
4,013
1,301
854
108
293
1,068
128
765
10
326
736
4,378
23
79
741
703
2,176
2,127
262
4
1,067
23
90
1,402
206
222
167
241
237
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Notes
1. An interesting and somewhat related historical
example of many of the predictions relative
to social and economic segregation when an
infectious disease outbreak occurs was noted by
Acemoglu et al. (2001) who found that European
colonialists rarely fully integrated with local pop-
ulations when faced with high infectious disease-
elated mortality rates, rather tending to simply
set-up extractive institutions thus segregating
themselves, to the extent possible, from the locals
and the accompanying infectious diseases.
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